Nonlinear dynamics and covered interest rate parity by Nathan S. Balke & Mark E. Wohar









Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas





, Department ()f Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275 (214-768-2693)
and Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (214-922-5186): E-mail:
nbalke@mail.smu.edu
" Distinguished LucasProfessor, DepartmentofEconomics, UniversityofNebraska at Omaha,
CBA-512K, Omaha, NE 68182 (402-554-3712). E-mail: Wohar@Unomaha.edu
The authors would like to thank Jeanette Diamond, Michael O'Hara, Baldev Raj, two
anonymous referees, and participants at the Midwest Econometric Meetings for helpful
suggestions on an earlier draft. The views expressed herein are solely those ofthe authors and
should not be construed to be those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal
Reserve System.Abstract
This paper examines the dynamics ofdeviations from covered interest parity using daily data
on the UK/US spot, forward exchange rates and interest rates over the period January 1974 to
September 1993. Like otherstudieswefmd a substantialnumberofinstances during the sample
in which the covered interest parity condition exceeds the transactions cost band, implying
arbitrage profit opportunities. While most ofthese implied profit opportunities are relatively
small, there is also evidence of some very large deviations from covered interest parity in the
sample. In order to examine the persistence of these deviations, we estimated a threshold
autoregressive/threshold ARCH model in which the dynamic behavior of deviations from
covered interest parity differs outside the transactions cost bandthaninside them. We find that
while the impulse response functions when inside the transactions cost band are nearly
symmetric, those for the outside the bands are asymmetric--suggesting less persistence outside
ofthe transactions cost band than inside the band.1
1. Introduction
Thetheory ofcovered interest parity (CIP) links money market interest rates to spot and
forward exchange rates. Models offoreign exchange ratebehavior often assume that CIP holds
as a valid approximation. It is thus, not surprising that a fair amount of research has been
devoted to the empirical validation of this condition.' Practitioners are interested in CIP
because this condition may be used to simplify hedging practices for financial decisions.
Furthermore,significantviolations ofCIPcangeneratearbitrage opportunitiesfor international
market participants, resulting in profits. There are a number ofimportant empirical questions
that one must considerwhen examiningCIP. Thefirst deals with observed deviations from CIP.
A number ofstudies have identified significant deviations offorward rates from their covered
interest parity (see e.g. Frenkeland Levich, 1975, 1977, 1981; Otaniand Tiwar~ 1981; Bahmani-
Oskooee and Das, 1985; Sharpe, 1985; Overturf, 1986; Clinton, 1988; Fletcher and Taylor, 1994;
Abeysekera and Turtle, 1995).'
Previous research has attempted to rationalize these deviations from CIP in terms of
optimizing behavior. Such an approach views deviations from CIP as a response to real world
frictions, including transactions costs, [Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977, 1981)], capital market
imperfections such as capital controls and/or political risk (Prachowny, 1970; Frenkel, 1973;
Dooley and Isard, 1980; Otani and Tiwari, 1981; and Blenman 1991), imperfect substitutability,
political risk (Aliber, 1973), as well as differential tax treatment, inelastic demand and supply
schedules, and other risk premia influences. Such market frictions result in 'neutral bands'
around the theoretical parity condition within which profitable arbitrage activities are not
possible.
A second issue related to the magnitude ofdeviations from CIP is the speed with which
short-run deviationsfrom CIP areeliminated and convergence to equilibrium is achieved. Most2
studies that examine the empirical validity of CIP deal mainly with the size of raw deviations
relative to estimates oftransactions costs (referred to as profitable trading opportunities) and
pay less attention to the speed with which these profitable trading opportunities are eliminated.
However, using informal analysis Clinton (1988) concluded that, at least for the Euromarket,
profitable trading opportunities are small and transitory. This result has been corroborated by
the workAtkins (1991, 1993). Atkins employedcointegrationmethodology andreported results
which suggest that deviations from CIP in the Euromarket arein general eliminatedwithin two
days, with this time decreasing as one moves from the 1970s through the 1980s.'
In this paper, we examine the dynamics of deviations from CIP for the UK using daily
data over the period January 1974 to September 1993. First, similar to other studies we
calculate thepercentage ofobservations found to liewithin the transactions costs bands (i.e. the
so called 'neutral zone') as well as the percentage above and below these bands. To avoid
indirect measures of transactions costs, our empirical investigation uses direct measures
embedded inthe bid-ask spread.' Wefind numerous observations inwhich the covered interest
parity condition exceeds the transaction costs bands. In addition, we examine the persistence
of these deviations over time.
The presence oftransaction costs bands suggests that deviations from CIP should exhibit
somenonlinear dynamics. Onewould expect that thepersistence ofdeviations from CIP should
be substantially lower outside the transactions cost bands than inside them as agents act to
exploit the implied profit opportunities. Thus, the presence of transactions costs implies that
deviations from covered interest paritymight be modeled as a threshold autoregression (TAR)
in which the dynamic behavior ofdeviations from CIP changed ifthey exceed the transactions
cost bands.' In addition, to capture the variable volatility and the "fat-tailed" nature of
deviationsfromCIP,we allowed for threshold-ARCH (TARCH) effectsinwhich theconditional3
variance of deviations from CIP can change over time and across thresholds. Using this
threshold autorgression/threshold ARCH (TAR/TARCH) framework, we examine the
difference inthe dynamics ofdeviations from CIP that occurwithin the transactions costs bands
versus the dynamics of those which occur outside the neutral zone by employing nonlinear
impulse response analysis. By calculating impulse response functions conditional on whether
one starts inside or outside the transactions cost band, we can compare the persistence of
deviations from CIP that imply exploitable profit opportunities with those in which no profit
opportunities exist.
The outline ofthe paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a briefreview ofthe literature
concerning covered interest parity and transactions costs. Section 3 presents the theoretical
underpinnings of the literature on covered interest parity including a discussion of the role of
transactions costs in the context ofcovered interest parity. Section 4 describes the data used.
Section 5presentsanempirical examination ofdeviations from CIP and compares findings with
previous work in this area. Section 6 describes the threshold autoregression/threshold ARCH
model employed to capture! these dynamics. Section 7 examines dynamics through the use of
impulse response functions. Section 8 presents a summary and conclusion.
2. BriefLiterature Review
A large portion of the empiricalliterature on deviations from covered interest parity has
focused on the size of transactions costs. In two important papers Frenkel and Levich (1975,
1977), define a neutral zone as the area which surrounds the CIP condition above and below,
within which observed deviations from CIP can occur without yielding any profit after netting
out transactions costs. They estimate these transactions costs·in the market for foreign
exchange by using data on triangular arbitrage and conclude that CIP holds net oftransactions4
costs. They also fmd evidence of a regular flow of profit opportunities in which the return
exceeds transactions costs. However, the later work of Deardorff (1979), Callier (1981), and
Bahmani-Oskooee and Das (1985) argued that the size ofthe transactions costs were in reality
much smaller than those reported by Frenkel and Levich.
Much ofthe ClPliterature debates the magnitude ofthe neutral zone in the presence of
transaction costs, liquidity risk, political risk, and other market frictions which would cause
violations of ClP. Clinton (1988), for example, demonstrated that the neglect of the swap
market resulted in a serious overstatement oftransactions costs and its introduction made the
neutral zone even narrower than those found by Deardorff, Callier, and Bahmani-Oskooee and
Das. Using daily observations over the period November 1985 to May 1986, in which careful
attention was given to accurate timing,' Clinton (1988) found that in the Euromarket,
transactions costs should not give rise to deviations from ClP in excess of .06 percent between
well traded currencies.
7 Although Clinton found that net deviations (i.e. net of transactions
costs) from CIP were transitory and small enough to support the assumption of CIP, he also
found that raw deviations often occurred outside transactions costs bands, and thus there were
times in which profit opportunities were available.
More recently, Fletcher and Taylor (1994, 1996) examine whether CIP holds in markets
for long-term assets.' They examinecovered arbitrage boundaryconditionsintheEurobond and
foreign bond markets in the 5-, 7-, and 10 year maturities for five currency pairs. Theempirical
evidence which they present suggest that deviations from CIP (in excess of transactions costs)
do exist. Theyfind that these disequilibrium statescan have long memories (that dissipate over
time) which lead to a window ofprofitable trading opportunities. They also fmd that in every
long-term market there is a set of outliers that substantially violate theClP condition. Most
recently, Abeysekera andTurtle (1995), using theJohansenVAR/error-eorrection methodology5
and employed weekly data over the period 1984-1991, for Canada, Germany, Japan, and the
UK, find substantial deviations from CIP over this period.
Abeysekera and Turtle (1995; p. 433) may have anticipated our current research when
they made the following points.
"Without data on the level of market imperfections such as transaction costs or bid-ask
spreads, we cannot comment on the presence of arbitrage opportunities." "...future
research should attempt to incorporate bid-askspreads and transaction costs directly into
the analysis."
In the next section, we present the theoretical foundations ofthe literature on CIP along with
a discussion of transactions costs in the context of CIP.
3. The Covered Interest Rate Parity Condition
A. CIF without Transactions Costs
In markets where arbitrage is active and unfettered, the net return offered by a financial
instrument denominated in foreign currency should be approximately equal to the net return
offered by a similar financial instrument denominated in domestic currency. This is the basis
ofthe CIP condition. The concept ofinterest parity recognizes that portfolio investors at any
time t have the choice of holding assets denominated in the domestic currency (say dollars)
offeringtherate ofinterest is between time t and t+1or assets denominated in foreign currency
offering a rate of interest i" Thus, an investor beginning with one unit of domestic currency
needs to compare the option of accumulating 1+i$ units with the option of converting (at the
spot exchange rate) into 8 units of foreign currency, and investing in foreign assets to
accumulate 8(1+i,) units of foreign currency at time t+1, and then reconverting back into
domestic currency. If domestic and foreign assets differ only in their currency denomination,6
and if investors have the opportunity to cover against exchange rate uncertainty by arranging
at time t to reconvert from foreign to domestic currency one period later at the forward
exchange rate F (units of foreign currency per units of domestic currency), then market
equilibrium requires the CIP condition holds.





where F is the T-period forward exchange rate (foreign currencyper domestic currency--in this
case the US dollar), S is the spot exchange rate (foreign currency per US dollar), i, is the
interest rate on foreign assets, i. is the interest rate on dollar denominated (domestic) assets,
and T is the time to maturity ofthe assets" The left-hand-side of equation (1) is the forward
exchange premium (FP) (or discount) and the right-hand-side of equation (1) is the nominal
interest rate differential (ID).
B. Lender and Owner Arbitrage and Transaction Costs Bands
With transactioncosts, thecovered interest paritycondition impliedbyno arbitragegiven
by equation (1) is replaced by a pair ofconditions. Consider thecase of no "lender" arbitrage.
Lender arbitrage is the case in which a trader can make riskless profits by borrowing one
currency and then lending the other. For no lender arbitrage, the speculator does not take a
position. One simply borrows, say $, and lends, say pounds, to make a riskless profit. In this
case the investor puts up no capital ofhis own. The absence of"lender" arbitrage for borrowing
dollars and lending the foreign currency implies the following condition7
(2)
where SA is the asked spot rate (foreign currency per dollar) and P" is the bid forward rate
(foreign currency per dollar), iA , is the asked interest rate on dollar deposits and i", is the bid
interest rate on foreign deposits. A similar condition holds for no lender arbitrage for
borrowing the foreign currency and lending dollars and is given by
(3)
Combining these conditions and rearranging implies
Some additional algebra yields
(4)
The middle term of (4) is the covered interest parity condition based on the geometric mid-
point, or average, of the bid/ask prices while the outer terms are essentially the geometric8
average of the bid/ask spreads and their reciprocals. If equation (2) is violated, then it is
profitable to borrow domestic currency (dollars) and lend foreign currency (pounds). If
equation (3) is violated, then it is profitable to borrow foreign currency (pounds) and lend
domestic currency (dollars). We can relate this to equation (4). If the right hand side of
equation (4) is violated (i.e. one is above the upper bounds) this implies the violation of
equation (3). Hence, ifelP (evaluated at geometric average of bid-ask spread) is greater than
the upperbound then, this is equivalent to saying that it pays (there arearbitrage opportunities)
to borrow pounds and lend dollars at theexistingbid-askspreads. Similarly, iftheleft hand side
of(4) is violated (i.e. below the lower bounds) this implies a violation ofequation (2) and itwill
pay to borrow dollars and lend pounds at the existing bid-ask spread.
Taking logarithm of equation (4), yields
(5)
where
The term cip is approximately the percentage deviation from the covered interest parity
relationship evaluated at the geometric average of the bid and asked prices. The transaction9
cost bands are given by 8' and 8
U
• Note that for lender arbitrage deviations from covered
interest parity fluctuate in a region symmetric around zero. This region is determined solely
on the basis of the ratio of bid and asked prices or the transactions costs.
We can also derive a similar condition for no "owner" arbitrage. Owner arbitrage is the
case where a trader initially has a cash position in one currency and can invest in assets
denominatedinthatcurrency or ofanothercurrency. Unlike lender arbitrage, owner arbitrage
requires traders to put up their own capital. Inthis case where the investor has a cash position
in $, the question is whether one should keep the $ or sell $ and purchase foreign currency.
The absence of"owner" arbitrage implies the following conditions:
and
After some algebraic manipulation these conditions imply:
a~ ,: cip ,: If. (6)
where
I+f
a" = au - T log(--..1) 0 .B
1+lf
1+iA
~ = a ' + T log(--$).
.B
1+1$
The transaction band is smaller for owner than for lender arbitrage since there is one less10
transaction that needs to takeplace--no borrowing has to be undertaken as the investor already
has one of the assets. Note also that for owner arbitrage, cip is not necessarily bounded by a
symmetric band; the band is only symmetric if the bid/ask ratio for the interest rates are the
same.
4. Description ofData
Daily data on bid and ask prices for spot and forward exchange rates for the British
pound are obtained from Data Resources Incorporated (DR!) for the period January 1974 -
September 1993. Currencies are expressed as foreign currency per U.S. dollar. The forward
rates are for a "one-month" term. Interest rates.are also obtained from DR! and are I-month
Eurorates quoted on an annual basis. All data prior to October 8, 1986 are 9 a.m. New York
open Quotes. Data after October 8, 1986 are London close (11 a.m. New York time)."
Thedecision to employEuro-depositrateswas motivatedby severalconsiderations. First,
the use of Euro-deposit rates ensures that the underlying asset is comparable. Euro-deposits
denominated in different currencies are issued by banks that have similar default risk. This
means that term structures of different countries are comparable because they do not have to
be adjusted for differing default risk. In addition, Euro-deposit rates are not subject to capital
controls because they areoffshore securities, and hence, rates indifferentcountries do not have
to be adjusted for differing capital controls. Thus, eurocurrency deposits are comparable in
terms ofcredit risk, maturity, and issuer, butnot in terms ofcurrency denomination (see Levich
(1985». Furthermore, high quality data for domestic interest rates are not easily obtained for
all countries. In some countries, other than the U.S. and Canada, domestic Treasury bill rates
are not always market clearing, and hence will not reflect the true cost of credit, while Euro-
deposit rates are market clearing. Treasury bill rates are not always market clearingbecause in11
some countries there are either restrictions on the number of participants which can trade in
such markets or the government imposes limits on price fluctuations of such securities. That
these considerations are important is evidenced by the discussion of Marston (1993).
5. Empirical Analysis: Departures from Covered Interest Parity
Figure 1plots the logarithm ofthe forward premium evaluated at the geometric average
of bid and asked rates (log(FIS», the logarithm of the interest rate ratio evaluated at the
geometric average of bid and asked rates (T log[(1+i,)/(1+is»)])," as well as deviations from
covered interestparity again evaluated at the geometric average ofbid and asked prices (cip,).!2
From the figure it is clear that the deviations from covered interest parity (i.e. cip, not equal
to zero) relative to the fluctuations in forward premiumand the ratio ofinterest rates are quite
small. It is also apparent that deviations from covered interest parity can be quite persistent.
While deviations from covered interestparity arestationary(theaugmented Dickey-Fuller t-stat
is -5.61), there are substantial periods in which cip, is above or below zero.
Figure 2 plots deviationsfrom covered interest parity aswell asthetransaction costbands
implied by no lender arbitrage. From the figure, there appear to be violations of the covered
interestno arbitrage conditions as deviationsfrom coveredinterestparityexceed thetransaction
costs bands implied by no lender arbitrage. Table 1 presents the number oftimes that the no
arbitrageconditions areviolated for the alternative transactionscostsbands. Fromthe diagram,
these violations appear to beclustered together suggesting some persistence to these violations
as well. Interestingly, while the transactions costs bands arenotconstant, they are, nonetheless,
relatively stable. The results for no owner arbitrage are similar except that the transactions
bands areslightly narrower and, hence, therearemoreviolations ofthe no arbitrageconditions.
While only a small percentage oftheobservations fall outside the transactions cost bands,12
there are a surprising number of violations given the findings of Taylor (1987) and (1989).
Taylor (1987) examined observations sampled 10 minutes apart during November 11, 12, and
13 of 1985 and failed to find a single violation ofno arbitrage. This period is relatively stable
compared with other periods in our sample. Even for periods examined in his second study
(Taylor (1989», which overlap those in this study, the CIP condition was relatively stable.
Clinton (1988), on the other hand, fmds similar percentages to those shown in Table 1 in a
sample taken over the period November 1985 to May 1986.
There is also evidence of some very large deviations from covered interest parity in the
sample. These coincide with several events such as the attack on the British pound and
subsequent withdrawal ofthe United Kingdom from the EuropeanExchange Rate Mechanism
in September 1992. Many ofthese same observations also violate the no arbitrage conditions.
Nonetheless, even after the outliers are removed (see second column ofTable 1) there are still
numerous violations of the no arbitrage conditions."
In Table 2, we present the mean, median and standard deviations ofthe gross deviation
from CIP and the transaction costs implied by no lender and no owner arbitrage. The mean
deviation is stlHistically different from zero", this indicates that despite the symmetric
transactions bands implied by no lender arbitrage some type ofwedge causes the CIP condition
..;
for the US and UKto systematically deviate from zero in one direction. Nonetheless, themean
deviation from CIP is dwarfed by its standard deviations, indicating that deviations are highly
variable. As a comparison, the average lender transactions cost (i.e. 6
U
) is 0.0008 or 0.08
percent. This figure is slightly higher than that ofClinton (0.06 percent) but smaller than that
ofMcCormick (0.09). Themean deviations from CIP is less than the mean oftransactions costs
which suggest that one could not make profits on average by randomly engaging in CIP
arbitrage.13
Assuggested by the results inTable 1, there are a substantial number ofinstances during
the sample in which the covered interest parity condition exceeds the transaction costs band.
These instances imply arbitrage profit opportunities. To better understand the nature ofthese
opportunities, Figure 3plots a histogram ofthe implied lender arbitrageprofits over thesample.
For ease of interpretation we display these profits in terms of the approximate rate ofreturn
over thecourse of a year ifthese opportunities were available for every trading day during that
period.
1S From Figure 3, it is clear that most of the actual profit opportunities are relatively
small-less than four percent on an "annual" basis. There appear to have been some very rare
opportunities for extremely large profits over the course of the sample--on twelve occasions
arbitrage profits entailed "annual" returns over 100%! Nevertheless, because arbitrage profit
opportunities in general and large ones in particular arerelatively rare, thescope to makelarge
systematic profits from engaging incovered interest parity arbitrage is limited. Looking at the
entire sample, including observations in which no profits were available, the average net profit
was .0056 percent.
l
• This translates into an "annualized" return of 1.4 percent--a fairly paltry
returns from engaging solely in dollarjpound covered interest arbitrage. The "annualized" rate
ofreturn from owner arbitrage is a more (respectable) 2.3 percent (average net profit of .0091
percent per transaction), although as we suggested above, to engage in owner arbitrage,
arbitragers must put up their own capital.
Not only areprofit opportunitiesfrom covered interest arbitrage relatively small, they are
typically of short duration. Table 2, Panel B presents the frequency of durations outside the
transactions cost band. An overwhelming majority ofdurations outside ofthe transactions cost
band are of one or two days. Nonetheless, there are several episodes in which the duration
outside the transactions band lasted five or more days. We conduct a more formal analysis of
the persistence of arbitrage opportunities in Section 7 below.14
This discussion ofprofit opportunities is just meant to be suggestive rather than an exact
accounting. The sampling interval of one day may be too long and it may be that adjustment
actually takes place hourly. To the extent that this is a problem, the result would be a shorter
adjustment time, and thus, the findings of this paper may be viewed as upper bounds on
adjustment periods.
6. Empirical Analysis: Threshold Autoregressions for Covered Interest Parity
If the no arbitrage conditions strictly hold then deviations from covered interest parity
should be bounded by the transactions costs bands. Yet, as we saw above there appear to be
numerous and persistent deviations from CIP that exceed the transactions cost bands.
Nonetheless, even ifdeviations from CIP exceed the transactions bands, one might suspect that
deviations from CIP outside the transactions cost bands would be substantially less persistent
than those inside the transaction cost bands as market participants will eventually respond to
large and/or persistent arbitrage opportunities.
A relatively simple model that can capture the possible change in persistence as covered
interestparity conditionmoves outside the transactions cost band is a threshold autoregression.
Here the parameters ofan autoregression for dp, change depending on whether dp,_! is above,
inside, or below the transactions cost bands. Specifically, let dp, be described by a threshold
autoregression (TAR):15
J
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where 1(.) is an indicator function that is oneifthe condition holds and zero otherwise. OU,.! is
the upper bid/ask transaction band while 0',_, is the lower bid/ask transaction band.
17 In our
empirical application, we take the thresholds to betheupperand lower transactions bands from
lender arbitrage (i.e. O',.! = _OU,_,)," While threshold autoregressions have been used in
economics before (see for example Terasvirta and Anderson (1992), Potter (1995), Balke and
Fomby (1997», one difference in the application here is that the thresholds (i.e_ the bid/ask
spread) are not constant over time as OU and 0' change as the bid/ask spreads change." The
other difference is that we can take the thresholds as known which greatly simplifies estimation
and inference.
In addition, as in many financial time series, thevolatility ofcip, appears to change over
time and that shocks to cip, appear to be characterized by a "fat-tailed
u distribution (hence the
numerous outliers). As a result, we allow for the conditional distribution of E, to differ across
regimes and over time. In particular, E, = (h'.)'/'v, where h'. = E[e,'I0,.,] is the conditional
variance of E, given information at t-l (0,.,) and differs across regimes (i = u, m, or I indicates
whether the covered interest parity condition is above, inside, or below the transactions cost
band). The standardized shockv, is assumed to have a t-distributionwith u' degrees offreedom
which may also differs across regimes.'" Herewe specify theconditionalvariance by anARCH
model ofthe form:
for i = u, m, or l. An examination of autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions ofK
h I = b I + Eb Ie' to kt-k '-1
the squared residuals from the basic TAR suggests anARCH model of order K = 7.
16
(9)
Because we take the thresholds to be the bid/ask transactions cost band, the thresholds
are assumed to be known and, hence, need not be estimated. Therefore, we estimated the
above model given the actual bid/ask transactions cost bands. To test whether a threshold
autoregression is appropriatefor covered interest parity, one simply tests ifthe autoregressions
are the same across regimes, i.e. if aU) = am; =a
l
; for j =0, ..., J. Similarly, we can test whether
the conditional distribution of e, is constant across regimes by testing bU. = bm • =b
l
", k = 1 to
K, and VU= vm= VI.
Table 3 presents tests ofparameter equality across regimes.'! We present results for a
basic TAR estimated by OLS as well as for the threshold ARCH (TARCH) model which was
estimated by maximum likelihood. Clearly, for both the basic TAR and the TAR/TARCH
models we can reject the hypothesis that the parameters are constant across regimes." Both
the autoregressive and theARCH parameters are statistically different across regimes; only the
parameters of the t-distribution are not significantly different across regimes. While there is
some latent residual correlation and ARCH effects in the residual from the basic TAR, the
standardized residuals from the TAR/TARCH model do not appear to be serially correlated
or contain additional ARCH effects."
In our discussion above, we conjectured that the persistence ofdeviations from covered
interest parity should be substantially less when outside the transactions band than inside the
bands as market participants begin to take advantage ofarbitrage profits. Usually, a rough and
ready measure of persistence is the sum of the autoregressive coefficients; these indicate that
the regimes are not too different in this dimension. The sum of the AR coefficients in the17
upper, middle and lower regimes for the basic TARmodel are 0.75, 0.85, and 0.74 and are not
statistically different from one another. For the TAR/TARCH model, the sum of the AR
coefficients for the upper and lower regimes (0.78 and 0.87 respectively) are smaller than the
sum ofAR coefficients in the middle regime (0.92), but only the upper regime is statistically
different. However, in nonlinear models such as the TAR/TARCH model above, analysis of
persistence is substantially more subtle than in a linear model. The interaction between the
autoregressive coefficients, theintercepts, the thresholds, and even the conditionalvariancecan
all effect the persistence exhibited by the model. As a result, in the next section we turn to
nonlinear impulse response analysis in order to examine the persistence implied by the model
as a whole and by the individual regimes.
7. Understanding Dynamics: Impulse Response Analysis
To better understand the dynamics implied by the threshold model, we calculate impulse
.response functions for the covered interest parity condition. The nonlinear structure of the
model makes impulse response analysis substantially more complex than in the linear case."
The reason is th,at the moving average representation is not linear in the shocks.
The impulse response function (IRF) is the change in the forecasted value for cip'+K as
a result ofknowing the value ofan exogenous shock e" or
E[ciP"kIO""e,] - E[cip'+k10,.,],
where 0,-, is the information set at time t-1 and e, is a particular realization of the exogenous
shock. Unlike linear models, impulse response functions for the nonlinear model is, ingeneral,
conditional on the entire past history of the variables and the size and direction of the shock.
Furthermore, because the moving average representation ofciP'+k for the threshold model is not
linear in the e,'s, one cannot calculate the conditional expectations, E[cip'+kIO,_"e,] and18
E[ciPI..ln._t], by projecting the model forwards and setting future shocks (e,+;) to zero as is the
case with a linear model.
In order to calculate the conditional expectations for the nonlinear model, we essentially
simulate the model. Because there is a single shock and that shock affects the one-step-ahead
forecast linearly, in the initial period change in conditional expectations is just thevalue ofthe
shock. In order to calculate the conditional expectations, E[cipI+kIDl-l,eJ and E[cipI+kIDI_J, in
each subsequent period, however, we must simulate two separate histories: one in which the
shock at time t is known and one in which the at time t is not known but determined randomly.
In each period we draw a standardized shock, vt+" using resampled standardized residuals
(standardized by the conditional variance). Note this shock is conditional on regime because
the distribution of actual standardized residuals may differ across regimes. Thus, when the
simulated value for cipI+i_' is above the transaction cost band, we draw a standardized residual
from observation in which the upper regime was entered. The innovation e,+i is calculated by
scaling up V'+i by the conditional standard deviation, hi+i' Again, h,+i depends on the simulated
values of cipt+H and e"+i." This simulation gives a hypothetical history for cipI+" i = 0 to k. We
repeat this simulation 200 times, keeping thevalues ofD,., and e, the same for each simulation
but drawing different realizations ofV'+i' We average the simulations to obtain estimates ofthe
conditional expectations, E[cip'+k IDl-l'e,] and E[cip<+kI11,.,].
As suggested above, the IRFs are a function of the value ofthe shock, e" and the initial
conditions, D,_,. To evaluate the sensitivity of the IRF to the size and direction of the shock,
we calculated IRFs for positive versus negative, and small versus large shocks. Here we
considered two alternative ways to of specifying "small" versus "large" shocks. First, to get a
clear sense ofthedifference inpersistence across regimes, weconducted an experimentinwhich
the size of the shock was the same regardless ofthe current regime. To determine size ofthe19
shock, we then took a small shock to be equal to the 84th percentile ofthe distribution ofactual
nonstandardized residuals while a large shock was set to be the 97.7th percentile." Because in
reality the distribution of shocks differs across regimes, we considered a second way of
specifying the initial shock. In this case, e, = h.'/'v, where both h, and the distribution ofv, are
conditional on regime. If, for example, cip,., > 8,." then a "small" v, shockwas set to bethe 84th
percentile of standardized residuals for observations in the upper regime while a large shock
was set the 97.7th percentile. Selecting v, shocks when in the other regimes was conducted in
a similar fashion. The end result is that in this case "small" and "large" e, shocks Jould differ
across regimes and over time.
We also calculated IRFs for two different types of initial conditions. For the first, we
determined the initial condition by randomly drawing aninitial condition, unconditionally, from
the actual data. This was repeated 500 times and the resulting IRFs were averaged to yield an
IRF for cip" unconditional on 0,.,.
26 Alternatively, we calculate impulse response functions
conditional on regime. For example, for the IRF in the middle regime we randomly selected
as initial conditions dates in which the cip, series was in the middle regime. Likewise for the
upper and lower regimes. Again, we repeated these experiments 500 times and took the
average to estimate the IRFconditional on regime." By comparing these conditional IRFs, we
can get an indication of how the dynamics (and persistence) differs across regimes.
Finally, one last complication presents itself. Because the transaction cost band is not
constant over time, we had to specify the behavior of the thresholds when calculating the
impulse response function. The actual transaction band at time t-l was taken as part of the
initial condition (0,.,). However, current and future values of the thresholds were required for
the simulations used to calculate E[cip'+kIO,."eJ and E[cip'+kIO,.,]. Again, we set values for the
thresholds in periods t to t+k equal to the actual transactions cost band in those periods.
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Figure 4 displays the IRFfor the covered interest parity condition for theTAR/TARCH
model for the case where the initial shock is the same across regimes. Because episodes in
which the transactions band is exceeded are relatively rare, the average (or unconditional) IRF
and the IRF for the middle regime are nearly symmetric. However, theIRF for the upper and
lower regimes are asymmetric, particularly in thefew ofperiods immediately following a "large"
shock. When CIP is initially inthe upperregime, largepositive shocks get dissipated faster than
large negative shocks. The opposite is the case in thelower regime. We argue then that shocks
;:
in the outer regimes display less persistence than do shocks in the middle reiime. The
reasoning is as follows. Starting in the upper regime, a large positive shock is likely to cause
the CIP condition to remain outside the transactions cost bands in the initial period while a
negative shock is likely to push the CIP condition inside the transaction band. In the
subsequent period the different response to a positive and negative shock reflect primarily the
dynamic structure of the upper regime versus that of the middle regime. As a result, the
different responsein the outerregimes to positiveand negativeshocks reflects different degrees
of persistence in the various regimes. The difference in persistence can also be seen by
comparing the middle and upper (lower) regime response to a "large" positive (negative) shock.
Again, positive (negative) shocks are dissipated faster in the upper (lower) regime than in the
middle regime.
Figure 5 displays IRFs for the case where the size of the initial shock is conditional on
current regime. Once more, the impulse responsefunction for the lower regime is asymmetric--
suggesting less persistence outside ofthe transactions band than inside the band. On the other
hand, the asymmetry is not as apparent for the upper regime In addition, one can see that, on
average, "large" shocks in the outer and lower regimes are substantiallylarger than those in the
middle regime (nearly twice as large). Also, the fact that the distribution of shocks for the21
middle and upper regimes has fatter tails than that ofthe lower regime (see also the estimated
values oft-distribution degrees offreedom, Il', in TableA2oftheAppendix) shows up in Figure
5. "Large" shocks for both the middle and upper regimes arenearly three times larger than the
"small" shocks for these regimes while for the lower regime this ratio is less than 2.5.
8. Summary and Conclusion
A large amount ofresearch has been devoted to the empirical validation ofthe covered
interest parity (CIP). Most studies that examine the empirical validity ofCIP deal mainly with
thesize ofraw deviations relative to estimates oftransactions costs and payless attention to the
speed with which these profitable trading opportunities are eliminated. This paper contributes
and extends the above research on CIP in a number of respects. We argue the presence of
transaction cost bands suggests that deviations from CIP should exhibit some nonlinear
dynamics. In particular, the persistence of deviations from CIP should be substantially lower
outside the transaction cost bands (where there are potential profit opportunities) than inside
them. Thus, we model deviations from covered interest parity as a threshold autoregression
with threshold ARCH effects (TAR/TARCH) in which the dynamics of deviations from CIP
within the transaction cost bands differ from the dynamics of those occur outside the
transactions cost band. Using nonlinear impulse response analysis, we compare thepersistence
ofdeviations from CIP that imply exploitable profit opportunities with those inwhich no profit
opportunities exist.
Using daily data for the US and UK over the period January 1974 to September 1993,
we find numerous observations in which the covered interest parity condition exceeds the
transaction cost bands. Such findings call into question the practice of constructing forward
exchange rates using spot exchange rates and interest rate differentials, assuming CIP holds.'"22
Nonetheless, because arbitrage profit opportunities in general, and large ones in particular, are
relatively rare, the scope to make large systematic profits from engaging in covered interest
parity is limited. Furthermore, using impulse response functions implied by the threshold
autoregressive/thresholdARCHmodel,we find that deviations from covered interestparitythat
areoutside the transaction cost bands areless persistent than thoseinside the bands. Thus, not
only are profit opportunities from covered interest arbitrage relatively small, they are typically
ofshort duration.23
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Violations of Covered Interest No Arbitrage
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Note: The number in parentheses are the percentage of observations.TABLE 2
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TABLE 3. Tests of Equality Across Regimes and Residual Diagnostics
A. Threshold Autoregression (TAR) Model Estimated by OLS
Tests of EQuality Across Regimes
Autoregressive coefficients (including constant) are equal across regimes:
Homoskedastic errors: F(22,4912) = 6.45 (0.ססoo)
Heteroskedastic consistent covariance: Y(22) = 56.94 (0.ססoo)
Smn of autoregressive coefficients (not including constants) are equal across regimes:
Homoskedastic errors: F(2,4910) = 1.92 (0.147)
Heteroskedastic consistent covariance: y(2) = 1.52 (0.467)
Residual Diagnostic Tests
Tests for serial correlation in the OLS residuals
LM-test (F-test version, 20 lags):
Ljung-Box Q-Statistic (60 lags):
Tests for ARCH
LM-test (F-testversion, 20 lags):
Ljung-Box Q-Statistic for squared residuals (60 lags):
F(2O,4872) = 7.64 (0.000)
0(60) = 9739 (0.000)
F(2O,4904) = 5.91 (0.000)
0(60) = 161.91 (0.000)
B. Threshold AR/Threshold ARCH Model (TAR/TARCH) Estimated by Maximnm likelihood (ML)
Test of equality across regimes:
AR, ARCH coefficients, and t-distributions are equal across regimes:
AR Coefficients (including constant) are equal across regimes:
Smn ofAR coefficients (not including constant) are equal across regimes:
ARCH parameters are equal across regimes:
t-distributions are the same across regimes (V
U = vm = Vi):
Residual Diagnostic Tests
Tests for serial correlation in the standardized residuals:
LM-test (F-test version, 20 lags):
Ljung-Box O-Statistic (60 lags):
Tests for ARCH in the standardized residuals:
LM-test (F-test version, 20 lags):
Ljung-Box O-Statistic for squared standardized residuals (60 lags):
y(40) = 198.99 (0.000)
y(22) = 78.56 (0.000)
y(2) = 10.73 (0.005)
y(l6) = 6531 (0.000)
y(2) = 2.97 (0.227)
F(2O,4865) = 1.32 (0.155)
Q(60) = 40.84 (0.819)
F(2O,4897) = 0.73 (0.797)
Q(6O) = 15.55 (0.999)
'The tests of parameter equality across regimes are based on Wald statistics. The p-vaiues are in
parentheses.Table AI.
Basic Threshold AR Model Estimated By OLS
Variable Upper Regime Middle Regime Lower Regime
Constant 1.95x10'" 2.73x10-5' -.1.93x10"
(6.00xl0-') 7.l2x1<r (1.6x10")
apt_1 .168" .403' .065
(.043) (.024) (.065)
ciPt_2 .131' .071" .055
(.051) (.015) (.100)
ciPt_3 .080 .093' .187
(.050) (.015) (.144)
ciP'-4 .144' .076" .147
(.050) (.016) (.078)
ClPI·.5 .022 .074' .163
(.043) (.016) (.138)
ClPt-6 .070 -.044 -.021
(.052) (.015) (.158)
cip,.? -.042 -.011 .317
(.054) (.015) (.169)
ciPt_8 .126" 3.1Ox10·' -.334
(.055) (.015) (.171)
ClPt.9 .033 .11z' -.036
(.040) (.016) (.213)
cipt-to .019 .073" .200
(.059) (.014) (.165)
SEE 6.02x10" 4.05x10" 7.16x10"
30Table A2. TARJTARCH Model Estimated by ML
Coefficients Upper Regime Middle Regime Lower Regime
Constant 1.24xl0"'* -1.00.10" -9.32xl0·'
(3.21.10") (2.3S.10'") (1.28xl0")
ciPt_1 .241' .447- .056
(.041) (.016) (.108)
ciPt_2 .OSS .043· .143
(.036) (.014) (.093)
ciP'_3 .081 .092* .303-
(.046) (.013) (.133)
ciPt-4 .198' .083' .IS3
(.042) (.013) (.117)
ciPt.s .016 .178' .211'
(.047) (.OIS) (.088)
ciPt-6 .123' -.013 -.012 ,
(.039) (.012) (.099)
ciPt_7 -.026 -.000 .112
(.038) (.012) (.130)
ciPt-8 .045 .005 -.OS9
(.035) (.010) (.097)
ciPI-9 .010 .034' -.047
(.028) (.010) (.144)
ciPI_IO .040 .OSO' .009
(.035) (.009) (.107)
ARCH Coefficients




•1 .377' .591' .051
(.139) (.098) (.035)
,2
102 .086 .113' .022
(.073) (.038) (.173)
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S .512' .57S' .003
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,2





7 .077 .076' .039
(.067) (.025) (.097)




1. For surveys of some of this literature see Officer and Willett (1970), Thornton (1989), and
MacDonald and Taylor (1990).
2. One exception is Rhee and Chang (1992) who test arbitrage violations directly using high
frequency (intradaily) data and find only a small number ofviolations ofCIP over limited periods
of time.
3. This is in contrast to Pippenger (1978) who presents empirical results for the Canada-US CIP,
that indicate adjustment can take weeks.
4. Rhee and Chang (1992) have argued that indirect measures oftransactions costs, such as those
used byFrenkel and Levich are not appropriate for examining thefrequency of mar~etequilibrium
for at least two reasons. First, the validity of indirect measures of transactions costs require that
costs structures built into triangular arbitrage remain stable. Unfortunately, equilibrium conditions
tend to be violated when markets are unstable. Second, the indirect measures represent only an
average cost which does not capture the degree of uncertainty associated with each and every
arbitrage transaction. To be exact, the frequency of market disequilibrium should be compiled
based on individual transactions.
5. Balke and Fomby (1997) argue that transactions costs could give rise to time series that are
threshold cointegrated in which movement back towards a long-run equilibrium occurs only if
deviations from the equilibrium are "large". Along these lines, Anderson (1994) applies threshold
cointegrationto theterm structure ofinterestrates and estimates threshold errorcorrection models
for the term structure.
6. Other studies which have demonstrated that timing and accuracy of data is important include
McCormick (1979), Maasoumi and Pippenger (1989), and Taylor (1987,1989). McCormick (1979)
has analyzed the effects of using different closing prices from markets in different time zones (e.g.
close in New York for the OM and the close in London for the British pound) and finds that
deviations from triangular arbitrage declines substantially when exchange rates are quoted
simultaneously. Taylor (1987, 1989) use high quality, high-frequency data (five- and ten-minute)
to examine the hypothesis that the apparent unexploited profit opportunities for arbitrage may be
the result of inappropriate data, including issues of measurement error and timing. He finds very
few deviations from CIPwhen institutional detail was considered. More recently, Rhee and Chang
(1992) examined the frequency of simultaneous equilibrium on four markets using real-time
quotations drawn from Eurocurrency and interbank foreign exchange markets during the morning
trading hours ofNew York. Profit opportunities were examined not only for one-way but also for
covered interest arbitragers. Their results indicate that i) profit opportunities from traditional
covered interest arbitrage are rarely available, ii) thefrequency ofattaining market equilibriumwas
low, thus, opening the door for one-way arbitrage, and iii) profits from one-way arbitrage persist,
indicating why one-way arbitragers do not search for the least-cost arbitrage route.
7. These results were in contrast to those ofFrenkel and Levich (1981). Frenkel and Levich (1981)
employed Treasury bill rates for the US and Canada over the period 1973-1979 and calculated a
transaction cost equivalent to 0.125 percent per annum from bid-askspreads, which is twice as large
as those reported in Clinton (1988).33
8. Ifshort- and long-term assets were perfect substitutes within currencies, then CIP among long-
term assets could be regarded as an extension of the short-term CIP literature discussed above.
However, Popper (1993) points out that assets ofdifferent maturities are not easily substitutable,
and thus a different analysis is required for markets in which assets with longmaturities aretraded.
9. Much oftheliterature examining CIP assumes that forward contracts arethe relevant instrument
for evaluating CIP. But a large amount of 'forward' trading in foreign exchange is done through
swap transactions. As Clinton (1988) illustrates, this has important implications for evaluating the
transactions cost bandsfor a CIP-based arbitrage. Anothercaveat that should bepointed out is that
it is usually assumed that i. and it are interest rates on the assetswith the same characteristics. This
is why in this study we employ euro-deposit rates. If the interest rates used are on Treasury bills,
the two securities of the two different countries will usually not have the same risk characteristics.
10. Several filters were run on the data to check for errors, and unfortunately some errors were
found. After consultations with the staff at DRI the errors were corrected. '
11. T=1/12 here as euro-deposit rates are annual and forward rates have a 1 month maturity. We
could have alternatively multiplied the forward premium by 12, however, the chosen specification
is consistent with the model used in this paper.
12. Point estimates ofdeviations from CIP calculated from posted bids and asks will not in general
be equal to the actual deviations on either side ofthe bid or ask. The quotes actually only define
a rangewithin which trades may take place, while dealers normally negotiate for finer spreads than
those posted. Thus, we calculate all interest ratesvariables as the geometric average ofthe bid-ask
spread.
13. Weremoved observationsinwhich the standardized residualsfrom a linear autoregressionwere
greater than four. The rather large sample size made more formal, iterative outlier searches such
as Tsay (1988) impracticable.
14. The standard error of the sample mean is 8.0053 X 10-6.
15. The approximate annual profit lender arbitrage = (1 + 71".)250 - 1, where 71", is equal to Iciptl
OUt if IciptI - OUt > 0 and equal to zero otherwise. 71", is the rate of return for a given arbitrage
opportunity, so to get annual return we assume 250 trading days or (arbitrage opportunities) in a
year. As these profits apply to the no lender arbitrage case, the number ofdays in figure 3 sum to
527 (506 in upper regime and 121 in the lower-osee Table 1: full sample, No Lender Arbitrage).
16. This is similar to the profits for dollarIpound arbitrage found by Clinton.
17. The threshold autoregression for covered interest parity would imply threshold cointegration
(see Balke and Fomby (1997» for the forward premium for exchange rates and the interest
differential ifthe autoregression in the middle regime contained a unit root. However, in this case
deviations from covered interest parity appear to be stationary in all three regimes.
18. We did not separately examine a TAR/TARCH model for no owner arbitrage transactions
bands. The lender arbitrage case is the more the binding of the two as all instances of lender
arbitrage will also be instances of owner arbitrage. Furthermore, estimation of the basic TAR34
modelwith the no owner arbitrage transactions bandsyielded verysimilar results to those presented
in the paper. Thus, to save space we present results ouly for the no lender arbitrage case.
19. We also experimented with the estimation of a smooth transition autoregressive model but
difficulties in estimating the curvature ofthe transition functions forced us to settle on the discrete
threshold model as it is a more parsimonious model which does not require the specification of
transition functions.
20. Our use of a parametric distribution for v, ouly affects our estimation of the threshold model.
In the simulations used to construct impulse responses described below, we use the realized
standardized residuals as v, shocks.
21. Tables Al and A2 in the appendix present the details ofthe estimated threshold models. All
calculations including the impulse response analysis discussed below were conductf)d using RATS
Version 4.1. '
22. One can also reject the hypothesis that the autoregressive models for the upper and lower
regimes are equal. Similarly, for the ARCH models.
23. The lag length for the TARwas set at ten lags. For the TAR model estimated by OLS, this
was not sufficient to eliminate all the serial correlation in the residuals; however, when examining
the autocorrelation function of the residuals, it appears that this remaining serial correlation is the
result ofcorrelation ofresiduals at infrequent andirregularlags. Thiscorrelationis eliminated once
ARCH effects and a "fat-tailed" distribution for standardized shocks are allowed.
24. See Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) and Gallant, Rossi, Tauchen (1993) for a discussion of
nonlinear impulse response analysis.
25. Ifthe shocks were normally distributed, thesewould correspond to approximately one and two
standard deviation shocks.
26. For example, we first draw an initial date '1", from the actual data and calculate the IRF
conditional on that date. We thenreselect another date '1"" with replacement, and calculate another
IRF. This is continued until 500 initial dates have been selected for the model and then take the
average to obtain an IRF for cip.
27. When conditioning on each regime, we draw 500 different initial dates from the respective
regime and then take averages of the resulting IRFs. This gives us three conditional IRFs--one for
each regime, upper, lower, middle. These three, combined with the IRF obtained from drawing
initial dates from the full sample yields the four IRFs displayed in Figures 4 and 5.
28. In a previous version of this paper, we considered using a threshold autoregression to model
the bid/ask spread itself. However, the results were not substantially different from those reported
here. In future work, we hope the develop a more interesting model ofthe bid/ask spread, so that
we better explore thejoint dynamics between the covered interest parity condition and the bid/ask
spread.
29. Forexample Liu and Maddala (1992) follow Hsieh (1984) and construct one-weekforward rates
(in their tests of foreign exchange market efficiency) assuming CIP holds.Figure 1.
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